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CONTRACT LAW
I. A UNILATERAL MISTAKE IN A CONTRACT BID DOES NOT
NECESSARILY PRECLUDE THE BIDDER FROM RESCISSION
In National Fire Insurance Co. v. Brown & Martin Co.' a Federal
District Court in South Carolina addressed the novel question under
South Carolina law of whether a mistaken bidder is entitled to rescis-
sion of a contract and return of its bid bond when the bid is based on a
substantial computation error.2 The court held that rescission is appro-
priate if "(1) the error is so substantial that enforcement would work a
great wrong, and (2) notice is given before the nonmistaken party has
substantially changed its position so that it cannot be returned to the
status quo ante."3
The defendant, Brown & Martin Company (Brown & Martin),
submitted a $588,912 bid on a City of Columbia (City) sewer project.
Brown & Martin also submitted a $29,445.60 bid bond. The bid in-
structions required a bid bond in the amount of five percent of the bid.
If a bidder failed to execute the contract once awarded, the bidder
would forfeit its bond.
4
On November 15, 1988, the bids were opened, and it was discov-
ered that Brown & Martin's bid was the lowest by approximately
$100,000. Upon learning of this disparity, Brown & Martin's president,
Mr. Pringle Boyle, immediately reviewed the bid. He discovered a
$68,900 miscalculation. On November 16, 1988, the City Council voted
to accept Brown & Martin's bid. Later that day the City received a
hand-delivered letter from Boyle that sought withdrawal or correction
of the bid. The City denied the requested change and warned that fail-
ure to execute the contract would result in forfeiture of the bid bond.
Brown & Martin refused to execute the contract, and the City awarded
the contract to the next lowest bidder.5
National Fire Insurance Company of Hartford (National), the is-
suer of Brown & Martin's bid bond, sought a declaratory judgment
that the City was not entitled to recover the $29,445.60 bond. Alterna-
tively, National sought a declaration that Brown & Martin had to in-
1. 726 F. Supp. 1036 (D.S.C. 1989), aff'd mem., 907 F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. 1990).
2. Id. at 1039-40.
3. Id. at 1040.
4. Id. at 1037-38.
5. Id. at 1038-39.
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demnify it for any amount National paid on the bond. Brown & Martin
asserted that it was entitled to rescind the contract based on its mis-
taken bid and sought a declaration that the City was not entitled to
recover on the bond. The City sought a judgment in the amount of the
bond. All parties moved for summary judgment.6
Relying on three South Carolina cases, the court determined that
South Carolina law permits "a contract [to] be rescinded for unilateral
mistake not induced by the other party when the mistake is accompa-
nied by circumstances which would make it a great wrong to enforce
the agreement and the nonmistaken party may be returned to the sta-
tus quo ante."' 7 The court concluded that South Carolina courts would
apply this general rule to bidding situations.' The court further sup-
ported its ruling by noting that the majority of jurisdictions which
have addressed the issue have held "that under the proper circum-
stances a contractor should be permitted to withdraw a bid or rescind
a contract when its bid is based on a mistake of fact."
Applying the law to the facts before it, the court held that Brown
& Martin was entitled to rescission and that the City could not retain
the bid bond.'0 First, the court decided that the $68,900 computation
error, which constituted 11.7% of the total bid, was a substantial mis-
take "and that enforcement of the contract would work a great wrong
on Brown & Martin."" Second, the court found that Brown & Martin's
prompt notification to the City allowed the City to return to the status
quo ante.12 When Brown & Martin refused to execute the contract, the
City simply awarded the contract to the next lowest bidder."3
The court made these determinations despite bid instructions that
prohibited the withdrawal of bids after the bid opening.' In support of
its decision not to enforce this provision, the court cited to cases from
several other courts that had found similar instructions "ineffective to
prevent withdrawal or rescission where such relief is otherwise legally
6. Id. at 1039.
7. Id. (citing Scott v. Mid Carolina Homes, Inc., 293 S.C. 191, 199, 359 S.E.2d 291,
296 (Ct. App. 1987), overruled on other grounds, Ward v. Dick Dyer & Assocs., Inc., 403
S.E.2d 310 (S.C. 1991); King v. Oxford, 282 S.C. 307, 313, 318 S.E.2d 125, 128-29 (Ct.
App. 1984); Jumper v. Queen Mab Lumber Co., 115 S.C. 452, 458-59, 106 S.E. 473, 475
(1921)).
8. Id. at 1040.
9. Id. at 1039 (citing Annotation, Right of Bidder for State or Municipal Contract
to Rescind Bid on Ground That Bid Was Based upon His Own Mistake or That of His
Employee, 2 A.L.R.4TH 991, 1003-1021, 1029-1038 (1980)).
10. Id. at 1040.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. & n.9.
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justified." 15 Having reached these conclusions, the court granted sum-
mary judgment to National and to Brown & Martin."6
In a subsequent motion to alter or amend the decision, the City
asserted that Brown & Martin's mistake resulted from negligence, and
therefore, the company was not entitled to equitable relief under South
Carolina law.'7 The City relied heavily on the 1883 case of Kennerty v.
Etiwan Phosphate Co., 8 which states that equitable relief is unavaila-
ble to a party who enters a contract based on a mistaken belief if the
mistake was caused "solely by the negligence or inattention of [that]
party" and not because of any fault of the other contracting party, "ex-
cept under very strong and extraordinary circumstances, showing im-
becility or something which would make it a great wrong to enforce the
agreement."' 9
The district court distinguished Kennerty on two grounds. First,
the court noted that "the Kennerty court did not hold that a con-
tracting party's negligence bars equitable relief under all circum-
stances.'20 Second, the court pointed out that the plaintiff in Kennerty
sought reformation, not rescission-a distinction the Kennerty court
also noted.2 ' The Brown & Martin court then cited Hester v. New Am-
sterdam Casualty Co.22 for the proposition that a court may grant re-
scission, depending on the circumstances, for a unilateral mistake even
if the mistaken party is negligent.2 3 Most jurisdictions that have ad-
dressed the issue allow relief from a bid for unilateral mistake under
certain circumstances.2 4 Courts differ, however, on the standard of care
a bidder must exercise before rescission is appropriate. Some states re-
quire only that the mistake not result from "'a failure to act in good
faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair dealing.' ,,25
15. Id. (citations omitted).
16. Id. at 1041.
17. Id. (on motion to alter or amend).
18. 21 S.C. 226 (1884).
19. Id. at 235.
20. Brown & Martin, 726 F. Supp. at 1041 (on motion to alter or amend).
21. Id. (citing Kennerty, 21 S.C. at 239).
22. 268 F. Supp. 623 (D.S.C. 1967).
23. Brown & Martin, 726 F. Supp. at 1041-42 (citing Hester, 268 F. Supp. at 630).
24. Id. at 1039 (citing Annotation, supra note 9, at 1003-21, 1029-38); see, e.g., El-
sinore Union Elementary School Dist. v. Kastorff, 54 Cal. 2d 380, 353 P.2d 713, 6 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1960); Regional School Dist. No. 4 v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 4 Conn. App. 175, 493
A.2d 895, cert. denied, 196 Conn. 813, 494 A.2d 907 (1985); First Baptist Church v. Bar-
ber Contracting Co., 189 Ga. App. 804, 377 S.E.2d 717 (1989); Cataldo Constr. Co. v.
County of Essex, 110 N.J. Super. 414, 265 A.2d 842 (Ch. Div. 1970); Arcon Constr. Co. v.
State, 314 N.W.2d 303 (S.D. 1982).
25. Marana Unified School Dist. No. 6 v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 144 Ariz. 159,
165, 696 P.2d 711, 717 (Ct. App. 1984) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS §
157 (1979)), review denied, 144 Ariz. 159, 696 P.2d 711 (1985).
1991]
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Some require that the mistake "not have come about because of the
violation of a positive legal duty or from culpable negligence." 26 Others
require that the mistake have "occurred notwithstanding the exercise
of reasonable care. '27 On the other hand, a few jurisdictions preclude
rescission of contracts that involve any unilateral mistakes in the bid-
ding context.
2 s
The Brown & Martin court did not explicitly define the standard
of care it applied. The court acknowledged that erroneous bids "usu-
ally involve some degree of negligence," but decided "that the bidder's
lack of care vel non should not necessarily determine its right to re-
lief.' '29 This statement suggests that only gross negligence or willful
misconduct by a bidder will lead to an automatic denial of relief for a
unilateral mistake.
The Brown & Martin approach to unilateral mistakes in bids ap-
pears to be designed to maintain the integrity of South Carolina's com-
petitive bidding practice. The requirements for a successful claim en-
sure that bidders will not be allowed to rescind contracts for minor
errors. The requirement of substantial loss protects the nonmistaken
party against rescission for minor errors without penalizing bidders for
inadvertent mistakes. As one court noted, "It is not in the public inter-
est to hold a bidder to a contract which would compel performance at a
substantial loss due to a serious error in his bid proposal. '3
0
In conclusion, the district court held that a bidder is entitled to
rescission of a contract and return of its bid bond when a computation
error is so substantial that enforcement would work a great wrong, pro-
vided that the bidder gives notice to the nonmistaken party before that
party has significantly changed its position. The court made this deci-
sion notwithstanding bid instructions that prohibited the withdrawal
of bids after bid opening. The court did not explicitly state what stan-
dard of care a bidder must exercise in preparing the bid in order to be
entitled to relief, but it implied that only bidders guilty of gross negli-
26. Baltimore v. DeLuca-Davis Constr. Co., 210 Md. 518, 527, 124 A.2d 557, 562
(1956).
27. Wil-Fred's Inc. v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 57 M11. App. 3d 16, 21, 372 N.E.2d
946, 951 (1978).
28. See John J. Bowes Co. v. Inhabitants of Milton, 255 Mass. 228, 233-34, 151 N.E.
116, 118 (1926); Board of Educ. v. Sever-Williams Co., 22 Ohio St. 2d 107, 113-14, 258
N.E.2d 605, 609-10, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 916 (1970); Colella v. Allegheny County, 391
Pa. 103, 108, 137 A.2d 265, 268 (1958).
29. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Brown & Martin Co., 726 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 n.8
(D.S.C. 1989) (citations omitted), aff'd mern., 907 F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. 1990).
30. Edward D. Lord, Inc. v. Municipal Utils. Auth., 133 N.J. Super. 503, 508, 337
A.2d 621, 623 (App. Div. 1975).
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gence or willful misconduct should automatically be denied relief.
Rebecca Dorman Groth
II. COURT APPLIES RECENTLY ADOPTED STANDARD THAT LOST PROFITS
MUST BE ESTABLISHED WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY IN BREACH OF
CONTRACT ACTIONS INVOLVING CONTEMPLATED BUSINESSES
In South Carolina Federal Savings Bank v. Thornton-Crosby De-
velopment Co.3 1 the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed a spe-
cial damages award arising from the breach of a construction contract
for a new business venture. The special damages were for lost profits,
loss of investment, and the amount of a deficiency judgment.
Simply because a business has not begun operations no longer pre-
cludes recovery for lost profits in South Carolina, but instead gives rise
to an evidentiary requirement that damages be proved with reasonable
certainty.32 An injured party may recover the lost profits of a new busi-
ness if the lost profits are a natural consequence of the breach, are
foreseeable, and can be established with reasonable certainty.
3
In Thornton-Crosby the issue of recovery of special damages for
lost profits, loss of investment, and a deficiency judgment on a con-
struction loan arose after the breach of a construction contract. Thorn-
ton-Crosby Development Company (Thornton-Crosby) contracted with
T.R. Tucker Construction Company (Tucker) to build a condominium
complex in Garden City, South Carolina. After numerous construction
delays, Tucker cosigned Thornton-Crosby's construction loan to induce
the lender to extend the loan period. A few months later Tucker aban-
doned the project. It abandoned the incomplete project almost eleven
months after the completion date called for in the contract because
31. 399 S.E.2d 8 (S.C. Ct. App. 1990).
32. Drews Co. v. Ledwith-Wolfe Assocs., Inc., 296 S.C. 207, 213, 371 S.E.2d 532, 535-
36 (1988) (citing South Carolina Fin. Corp. v. West Side Fin. Co., 236 S.C. 109, 122, 113
S.E.2d 329, 336 (1960)). The Drews court placed South Carolina among a growing num-
ber of jurisdictions that follow this approach. See Note, The New Business Rule and the
Denial of Lost Profits, 48 OHIo L.J. 855, 868-74 (1987). For an analysis of the develop-
ments leading up to South Carolina's transition to the evidentiary use of the new busi-
ness rule, see Annual Survey of South Carolina Law, "New Business Rule" No Longer a
Per Se Rule of Nonrecoverability of Lost Profits, 41 S.C.L. REv. 195 (1989). This rule
traditionally barred recovery of lost profits for new businesses on the ground that these
profits were speculative. See, e.g., Drews, 296 S.C. at 210, 371 S.E.2d at 534 (" 'When a
business is in contemplation, but not established or not in actual operation, profit merely
hoped for is too uncertain and conjectural to be considered.' ") (quoting Standard Sup-
ply Co. v. Carter & Harris, 81 S.C. 181, 186-87, 62 S.E. 150, 152 (1908)).
33. Drews, 296 S.C. at 213, 371 S.E.2d at 535-36.
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Thornton-Crosby was financially unable to perform.34
The lender sued to foreclose its mortgage on the project and
named both Thornton-Crosby and Tucker as defendants. Thornton-
Crosby crossclaimed against Tucker for breach of the construction con-
tract, and Tucker responded in kind. The lender prevailed in its fore-
closure action, which resulted in a deficiency judgment against Thorn-
ton-Crosby and Tucker. Thornton-Crosby prevailed on its contract
claims against Tucker. Tucker appealed.
3 5
The court of appeals affirmed. Relying on testimony offered by
Tucker's own expert, the court concluded that Thornton-Crosby had
established the amount of lost profits with reasonable certainty.36 The
court found that the lost profits were a natural consequence of
Tucker's breach and were reasonably foreseeable at the time the par-
ties contracted.37 The court also decided that damages for the defi-
ciency judgment rendered against Thornton-Crosby in the mortgage
foreclosure action were a recoverable element of special damages. 8
In addition to challenging the award as an improper element of
special damages, Tucker also argued that Thornton-Crosby should not
recover for the deficiency judgment because then Tucker might "have
to pay the deficiency judgment twice, while Thornton-Crosby pays
nothing at all. ' 9 Tucker assumed that this result could occur if Thorn-
ton-Crosby did not apply the damages award to satisfy the entire defi-
ciency judgment because Tucker would still be liable on the debt.
40
The court rejected Tucker's argument because it was "based on
speculation and a mistaken legal conclusion.""' The court noted that
no evidence supported Tucker's assumption that Thornton-Crosby
would not pay the entire deficiency or that the bank would attempt to
collect the debt from Tucker.42 The court also noted that if the lender
instituted an action against Tucker, the company would have recourse
to avoid paying the amount of the deficiency twice.43 The court con-
cluded that Tucker had "overlook[ed] a critical point: by seeking the
34. Thornton-Crosby, 399 S.E.2d at 10.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 11-12.
37. See id. at 12.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 13.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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full amount of the deficiency as contractual damages, Thornton-Crosby
has necessarily bound itself to pay the entire deficiency.""'
Margaret M. Fox
44. Id.
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